Shadow zones: transparency and pesticides regulation in The European Union by Hamlyn, Olivia
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Hamlyn, Olivia (2019) Shadow zones: transparency and pesticides
regulation in The European Union. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal
Studies 20 , ISSN 1528-8870. (In Press)
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/29346/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
 1 
 
SHADOW ZONES: TRANSPARENCY AND PESTICIDES REGULATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Olivia HAMLYN* 
University of Leicester 
Abstract 
In recent years, pesticides have captured the attention of both policy-makers and the general public. 
A particular focus has been the transparency of the EU-level procedure for approving active 
substances, spurred by controversies surrounding the active substance glyphosate. Active 
substances are the ingredient in pesticides with the pesticidal effect. Once an active substance is 
approved at EU level, the pesticide containing that active substance must be authorised by each 
Member State. For this purpose, the EU’s 2009 Plant Protection Product Regulation divides Member 
States into three zones – Northern, Central and Southern – within which, zonal rapporteur Member 
States evaluate applications for authorisation. National authorisation decisions are based on these 
zonal evaluations. This novel system governing pesticides is under-researched. Furthermore, unlike 
active substance approval, the transparency of pesticide authorisation escapes public and policy 
scrutiny. Drawing on empirical research conducted for the European Parliament, this article 
evaluates the transparency of the zonal pesticide authorisation procedure. It thus contributes to the 
literature on transparency a detailed exploration of transparency in a highly complex, decentred and 
polycentric risk regulation regime. While it finds that the zonal pesticide authorisation procedure, 
generally speaking, does not operate transparently, it argues further that levels of transparency 
within the regime as a whole may vary significantly depending on multiple different factors. It 
introduces the concept of ‘chiaroscuro regulation’ to characterise and understand these varying 
levels of transparency across different elements of the regime and considers some of its 
implications. 
Keywords: transparency, pesticides, risk regulation, regulation, governance, European Union 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pesticides frequently hit headlines. Controversies over the safety of glyphosate and neonicotinoids 
represent the two highest-profile examples.1 While these controversies shine valuable light on 
certain elements of EU pesticides regulation, other elements operate largely in darkness, escaping 
the glare of public, and academic, scrutiny. My aim here is to chase some of the shadows from these 
elements. The article originates in research conducted for a European Implementation Assessment 
                                                          
* I am grateful to Dr Steven Vaughan and Prof Cosmo Graham for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. I presented parts of this research at the 2018 LSA annual meeting in Toronto and the 2018 SLS annual 
conference in London. My thanks to the participants for their thoughts. I am also grateful to the editors and 
anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. Any mistakes are my own. 
1
 See, for example, Claire Stam, ‘Glyphosate has adverse health effects from doses considered safe, study 
shows’ (17 May 2018) https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/glyphosate-has-adverse-
health-effects-from-doses-considered-safe-study-shows/; Sarantis Michalopoulos, ‘Environmentalists clash 
with EFSA over neonicotinoids ban ‘exceptions’’ (9 August 2018) 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/environmentalists-clash-with-efsa-over-
neonicotinoids-ban-exceptions/. 
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(EIA) of the EU’s 2009 Plant Protection Product Regulation (‘the Regulation’ or ‘PPPR’).2 The EIA 
involved an in-depth empirical exploration of many aspects of the Regulation.3 This article, however, 
focuses on one aspect: the transparency of the authorisation procedure for plant protection 
products.4 As described below, longstanding concern over the transparency of pesticides regulation 
has intensified due to recent controversies, prompting or coinciding with developments in law and 
policy on pesticides and beyond, on the food chain generally.5 This represents an ideal moment to 
explore transparency in the EU and especially in the context of a regime home to much of the 
activity. While welcome, this activity is not beyond criticism. The vast majority of developments 
concentrate on improving transparency only in certain parts of pesticides regulation, discussed 
further below. This energetic, but limited, focus overshadows other parts of the regime equally 
deserving of attention, as explored throughout this article.  
Before proceeding, a note on terminology is warranted. For simplicity, in the following, I use 
the generic term ‘pesticides’ to refer to ‘plant protection products’. Pesticides are preparations – 
herbicides, insecticides, fungicides etc – applied to plants, seeds or plant products to protect them 
against harmful organisms.6 Pesticides contain one or more active substances; these are the 
ingredients with pesticidal effect. For example, glyphosate is an active substance and ‘Round-Up’ is a 
pesticide which contains glyphosate. 
The Regulation is discussed in Parts III and IV. For now, it suffices to say that it implements a 
dual assessment system for pesticides and their active substances. This involves, firstly, an EU level 
procedure for evaluating and approving active substances. Though the vast majority of public and 
policy scrutiny centres on this procedure, active substance approval is not the full pesticide 
regulatory story. The Regulation also divides Member States (and Norway) into three zones with 
comparable ‘agricultural, plant health and environmental (including climatic) conditions’ – Northern, 
Central and Southern, for the purposes of evaluating and authorising pesticides.7 In essence, 
applications for authorisation are evaluated at a ‘zonal’ level by a ‘zonal rapporteur Member State’ 
whose conclusions provide the basis for final, national authorisation decisions in that zone.  
The zonal pesticide authorisation procedure sparks little public interest and, despite the 
high, and controversial, public profile of active substance approval, pesticides regulation generally 
eludes the academic spotlight, although the EIA made a significant grab. Other contributions to the 
EIA and the only major work on the Regulation came from political science.8 Although this work 
engages with the law, legal academia itself throws little light on pesticides regulation.9 This is 
unfortunate because pesticides regulation generally, and the uniqueness of the Regulation’s 
                                                          
2
 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 [2009] OJ L309/1. 
3
 A Dinu, E Karamfilova and Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on the Placing of Plant 
Protection Products on the Market: European Implementation Assessment (2018). 
4
 I do, however, incorporate some empirical insights from my contribution to the EIA, O Hamlyn, ‘Assessing 
Member States’ Capacity for Reliable “Authorisation of PPPs”, and Its Uniformity’ (Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, 
2018), to supplement the discussion. The empirical research for that report involved the distribution of a 
survey to Member State competent authorities (CAs) containing quantitative and qualitative questions 
regarding, inter alia, the transparency of their procedures and practice. For a detailed methodology, see ibid 
40–50. 
5
 Discussed further in Part III. 
6
 The technical term ‘plant protection products’, used in the Regulation, in fact also refers to other types of 
preparations, such as plant growth regulators and pest repellents. 
7
 PPPR, Recital 29, Art 3(17), Annex I. 
8
 E Bozzini, Pesticide Policy and Politics in the European Union (Springer International Publishing, 2017). 
9
 Exceptions include O Hamlyn, ‘Sustainability and the Failure of Ambition in European Pesticides Regulation’ 
(2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 405, which discusses the Regulation’s sister Directive, Directive (EC) 
2009/128 [2009] OJ L309/71, and GC Leonelli, ‘The Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of 
European Union Risk Regulation’ (2018) 25(5) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 582. 
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pesticide authorisation procedure specifically, offer fertile ground for research, not only within the 
environmental law specialism but also with respect to EU regulation and governance generally. The 
regime established by the Regulation is characterised by the inter-play of different actors at different 
levels of governance – EU, national, as well as ‘zonal’ – and requires Member State competent 
authorities (CAs) to work together on the highly technical (in both scientific and legal terms) matters 
of evaluating and regulating the risks posed by pesticides and their ingredients. Furthermore, 
tensions between, for example, the public interest in safety and transparency and 
commercial/industrial interests in confidentiality and ensuring the availability of pesticides can result 
in these matters of evaluation and regulation becoming highly politicised. For these (and other) 
reasons, EU pesticides regulation presents openings to explore and further develop theory 
regarding, for example, risk regulation, decentred/polycentric regulation and the operation of 
regulatory agencies or networked, collaborative or multi-level governance. For now, the article seeks 
firstly, to understand and evaluate the level(s) of transparency achieved by the Regulation. Secondly, 
it uses this analysis to offer a more general observation about transparency in a highly complex, 
polycentric risk regulation regime. 
The article is structured as follows. Part II discusses transparency as a principle of 
governance. First, it contextualises transparency in the regulatory reforms sweeping Europe since 
the mid-1970s. Secondly, it presents a normative understanding of transparency in the context of a 
highly technical and complex, risk-based regulatory regime. Implementing transparency may depend 
on myriad requirements. The analysis in this article takes it as consisting of clarity with regard to the 
rules of the game, access to information and wider stakeholder and public participation in decision-
making. Part III first discusses the policy behind the Regulation and secondly, explores briefly the 
active substance approval procedure and recent transparency-related policy and legislative 
developments relating to that procedure. Part IV is the core of the article. Part IV A presents a 
description of the pesticide authorisation procedure and evaluates the transparency of this 
procedure against the three requirements defined in Part II. Part IV B highlights the importance of 
transparency in pesticide authorisation as well as active substance approval.  
Part V advances two arguments. Working from the analysis in Part IV, I argue that the zonal 
pesticide authorisation procedure, generally speaking, does not operate transparently. However, the 
transparency-focused analysis of the Regulation provides the basis for a second, more nuanced 
argument. I argue that levels of transparency within the regime established by the Regulation as a 
whole may vary significantly depending on multiple different factors. These factors include national 
regulator practice, actor, level of decision-making procedure (EU, zonal, national) and regulatory 
object. It is, as a consequence, impossible to draw universal and fixed conclusions about the 
transparency of regulatory actors and procedures in the context of such a complex, polycentric and 
continuously evolving regulatory regime. The result is a regime typified by varying shades of 
illumination and inumbration across its different elements, all with the potential to fluctuate; a 
phenomenon I define as ‘chiaroscuro regulation’.10 I use this concept to describe and encapsulate 
characteristics of this regime and its levels of transparency, as revealed by the analysis in this Part. 
These characteristics include the sharp contrasts in transparency within the regime, the relevance of 
the audience when discussing transparency and the significance of the gradual nature of 
developments in transparency. As a descriptive concept, it aims to epitomise and thereby aid 
understanding of the nature of transparency in complex regimes. Part V closes with consideration of 
some of the consequences of chiaroscuro regulation. Part VI concludes by highlighting the 
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 ‘Chiaroscuro’ is an Italian term which literally means ‘light-dark’. It is traditionally used to describe dramatic 
tonal contrasts in the visual arts, primarily paintings. 
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contingency of transparency, in practice, on those factors identified and the potential implications 
for democratic accountability and the quality of decisions. 
II. TRANSPARENCY IN CONTEXT 
Transparency is complex and, unlike pesticides regulation, increasingly elucidated by a rich and 
growing literature.11 Much of this literature is theoretical. It concerns reasons for and against 
transparency and measures for achieving transparency,12 often situated in the broader context of 
regulatory reform across Europe since the mid-1970s. Briefly, this reform was characterised by, inter 
alia, increasing delegation of regulatory powers to independent regulatory authorities at national 
and supranational levels.13 This ‘agencification’, while affecting mainly economic regulation, also 
touched social regulation, which encompasses the fields of, inter alia, pharmaceuticals, food safety 
and environmental regulation,14 and therefore pesticides regulation. Independence from elected 
officials, and therefore traditional methods of accountability, prompted concerns.15 The public 
cannot hold an authority to account unless its activities are first made visible.16 Thus transparency, 
being associated with making the exercise of power accessible or visible,17 became a crucial tool for 
ensuring accountability. Increased transparency has also been a response to the secrecy and opacity 
associated with previous regulatory styles and scandals.18 For example, transparency was central to 
post-BSE food safety regulation reform,19 and the constitution of both the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) and the UK’s Food Standards Agency.20 Improving the transparency of regulatory 
science was at the heart of EU reforms aimed at raising public confidence its law and policy on food 
safety at the turn of the century.21  
These developments in regulation have coincided with a diversification of regulatory arenas, 
leading to the decentring and polycentricity of regulatory authority, increasingly scattered across 
multiple interdependent or networked, state and non-state actors in multiple sub-national, national 
                                                          
11
 A good starting point is C Hood and D Heald (eds), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
12
 See contributions to Hood and Heald, note 11 above. 
13
 G Majone (ed), Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996), pp 3, 10–11, 47–48. 
14
 F Gilardi, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory 
Agencies in Western Europe’ (2005) 598 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
84, p 85. 
15
 M Thatcher, ‘Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual 
Mediation’ (2002) 25 West European Politics 125, p 141; M Everson, ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy 
Beaters?’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 180. 
16
 E Vos, ‘Independence, Accountability and Transparency of European Regulatory Agencies’ in D Geradin, R 
Muñoz and N Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2005), p 129. 
17
 E Fisher, ‘Transparency and Administrative Law: A Critical Evaluation’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 272, 
pp 277, 283. 
18
 E Vos, ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’ (2000) 23 Journal of Consumer Policy 
227, p 246; Thatcher, note 15 above, p 142; L Hellebø Rykkja, ‘Independent Food Agencies – Restoring 
Confidence’ (2004) 23 Policy and Society 125, p 129; R Löfstedt, ‘Risk Communication and Management in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (2004) 7 International Public Management Journal 335, p 340. 
19
 Hellebø Rykkja, note 18 above; Vos, note 18 above. 
20
 Fisher, note 17 above, pp 299-300; J Krebs, ‘Establishing a Single, Independent Food Standards Agency: The 
United Kingdom’s Experience’ (2004) 59 Food and Drug Law Journal 387. 
21
 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 [2002] OJ L31/1 (General Food Law), Recital 18; Commission, ‘White Paper on 
Food Safety COM(1999) 719 Final’; J Scott and E Vos, ‘The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the 
Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle within the EU and the WTO’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), 
Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp 282-283. 
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and transnational locations.22 Challenges include identifying the responsible institution in a 
progressively complex institutional landscape. With respect to independent regulators, a separate, 
independent identity has been argued to enhance transparency and openness,23 promoting visibility 
and control and accountability to dense networks of actors extending beyond the state.24 Other 
challenges include the blurring of the boundaries between expert advice and policy,25 and between 
public and private.26 Dispersal of regulatory responsibility or the pooling of information on risks from 
different sources may be exploited to institutionalise ambiguity and thereby avoid allocation of 
blame or liability simultaneously impeding the ability of citizens to understand the regime,27 
although ambiguity around authority can also have positive or productive consequences.28 One 
important hallmark of decentred regulation, for this article, is the fragmentation of knowledge. 
Beyond the familiar potential for information asymmetry between regulator and regulatee, within 
this ‘regulatory space’, resources, including regulatory authority, ‘information, wealth and 
organisational capacities’ and the knowledge and oversight necessary for problem-solving and 
effective regulation are dispersed across different state and non-state organisations, rather than 
monopolised by a hierarchical state.29 These combined developments intensify problems of 
accountability.30 They have also prompted calls for greater transparency.31  
Transparency is not a transcendent principle; its meaning and purpose vary depending on 
context.32 However, scholarship reveals certain norms which transparency may often encompass. It 
is possible therefore, drawing on literature on transparency, relevant EU law and policy and by 
reference to the specific characteristics of pesticides regulatory regime, to identify requirements for 
transparency in the context of this, and perhaps other, complex, transnational risk regulation 
regimes. This article takes transparency as consisting of three requirements. It is against these 
requirements that I evaluate the transparency of the Regulation in Part IV A. Firstly, clarity with 
regard to the rules of the game. Extending transparency to the ‘rules, data and informational 
requirements … used to make decisions’ is argued to build confidence in the regulator amongst 
publics and the regulated industry.33 The Regulation establishes complex procedures which operate 
                                                          
22
 J Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-
Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103, pp 105-112; J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting 
Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137, pp 
139-140. 
23
 Vos, note 18 above. 
24
 Vos, note 16 above, p 125; C Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and 
Society 38. 
25
 Vos, note 16 above, p 121; M Shapiro, ‘The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the 
European Union’ (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 276. 
26
 C Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State’ in J Jordana and D Levi-
Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2004), pp 146-147. 
27
 C Hood, H Rothstein and R Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp 128-129, 164-169. 
28
 M Lee, ‘The Ambiguity of Multi-Level Governance and (De-)Harmonisation in EU Environmental Law’ (2013) 
15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 357. 
29
 L Hancher and M Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in R Baldwin, C Scott and C Hood (eds), A Reader on 
Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp 159-160, 163-165; C Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: 
Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’ (2001) Public Law 329, pp 330-331, 334-338; Black, 
‘Decentring Regulation’, note 22 above, p 107. 
30
 Black, ‘Constructing’, note 22 above, p 141. 
31
 M Lodge and L Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 355, 359. 
32
 Fisher, note 17 above, pp 277, 283. 
33
 OECD, Principles for the Governance of Regulators: Public Consultation Draft (OECD 2013), pp 51-52. 
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differently across Member States.34 Clear descriptions of these procedures and how they operate in 
the national context would facilitate understanding as well as the involvement of stakeholders and 
civil society, the third requirement, discussed below. 
Secondly, access to information. Narrow definitions of transparency would refer to ‘minimal 
openness of process, access to documents and, publication of official measures’.35 A requirement, 
for example, that public authorities give reasons for their decisions activates accountability 
mechanisms, including judicial review, allowing citizens to defend their rights and the courts to 
exercise their supervisory functions as well as supporting public participation.36 It may also 
encourage decision-makers to balance the pros and cons of a decision more than those whose 
reasoning remains unlit, thereby helping to control discretion.37 Some argue that openness, 
transparency and honesty, generally, increase trust or confidence in organisations, while secrecy 
destroys it.38 Such trust may, furthermore, support a regulator’s legitimacy.39 The EU endorses many 
of the claims made of transparency. For example, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and EU 
legislation have supported public access to information for, inter alia, its contribution to 
transparency and democratic accountability.40 In addition, Directive (EC) 2003/4 recognises the 
contribution increased public access to environmental information makes to ‘a greater awareness of 
environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in 
environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment’.41 Despite these benefits, 
there are potential drawbacks to enhancing transparency, suggesting the need for care in promoting 
access to information. Transparency may in fact decrease trust and cause harm.42 For example, it 
could encourage members of the public to make their own decisions about risks, instead of relying 
on expert regulators.43 Publishing unfiltered scientific findings could cause public alarm with drastic 
public health consequences.44 Furthermore, transparency may precipitate disagreement disruptive 
of the bases and procedures of decision-making.45 This may be true especially where, as with 
pesticides, assessments of risk are already contested.46 
As discussed in Parts III B and IV A, pesticides regulation is information-heavy. Applicants 
generate and submit large amounts of information as part of their applications for approval or 
authorisation and decision-makers rely on this information to make decisions. More specifically, 
                                                          
34
 See Part IV A. 
35
 HCH Hofmann, ‘General Principles of EU Law and EU Administrative Law’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), p 207. 
36
 Majone, note 13 above, p 300. 
37
 M Shapiro, ‘The Giving Reasons Requirement’ (1992) University of Chicago Legal Forum 179, pp 180-181. 
38
 R Löfstedt, Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p xv; RG Peters, VT Covello 
and DB McCallum, ‘The Determinants of Trust and Credibility in Environmental Risk Communication: An 
Empirical Study’ (1997) 17 Risk Analysis 43. 
39
 TR La Porte and DS Metlay, ‘Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit of Trust’ (1996) 56 
Public Administration Review 341, p 342. 
40
 S Peers, ‘The EU’s Political Institutions’ in Barnard and Peers, note 35 above, p 69; P Craig and G De Búrca, 
EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 6
th
 ed (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 569-574. See also Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 [2001] OJ L145/43, Recital 2. 
41
 Directive (EC) 2003/4 [2003] OJ L41/26, Recital 1. 
42
 O O’Neill, ‘Transparency and the Ethics of Communication’ in Hood and Heald, note 11 above; Fisher, note 
17 above, p 282. 
43
 Löfstedt, note 18 above, pp 340–341. 
44
 Löfstedt, note 38 above, p xv; see also EESC, ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 
the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for 
Community Action to Achieve a Sustainable Use of Pesticides’ (2007), pp 7-8. 
45
 Fisher, note 17 above, p 305. 
46
 Bozzini, note 8 above, ch 4. 
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under the Regulation, authorisation decisions are based almost exclusively on scientific evidence, in 
the form of a risk assessment.47 Where scientific knowledge forms the basis of public decisions with 
significant implications for human health and the environment, as with pesticides, democratic 
control ‘demands some ability on the part of a polity to evaluate the knowledge claims that justify 
actions taken on its behalf’.48 Public reporting, and therefore the possibility of public scrutiny, of the 
relevant information may prevent regulators adjusting evidence to suit a policy position.49 Finally, 
improved public understanding of the bases for decisions enabled by transparency, particularly 
access to information, may ensure more effective participation, the third requirement.50 
Thirdly, wider stakeholder and public participation in decision-making. Beyond access to 
information, consultation is central to transparency.51 It has been argued that full transparency is 
only achieved through knowledge of decision-making acquired by direct participation.52 That said, 
full transparency through participation may not maintain or enhance trust in a regulator unless the 
public’s impression of the reliability of its internal operations actually improves as a result.53 Within 
the EU, the Commission has emphasised ‘effective and transparent consultation’ and a ‘reinforced 
culture of consultation and dialogue’, recognising the importance of public participation for good 
governance generally (albeit, there, in the context of policy formation rather than regulatory 
decision-making).54 Recital 3, Directive (EC) 2003/35 providing for public participation in respect of 
the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment states that ‘[e]ffective 
public participation in the taking of decisions enables the public to express, and the decision-maker 
to take account of, opinions and concerns which may be relevant to those decisions, thereby 
increasing the accountability and transparency of the decision-making process and contributing to 
public awareness of environmental issues and support for the decisions taken’.55 The Lisbon Treaty 
acknowledges the link between openness, transparency and participation.56 Likewise, the General 
Food Law conceives transparency as entailing openness and public consultation.57 
Furthermore, social and ecological uncertainty characterise the contexts of pesticide use.58 
Assessment of the risks pesticides pose is a highly complex task, presenting challenges for risk 
assessors and regulators.59 For example, the behaviour of farm workers applying pesticides in the 
field is unpredictable.60 So too, are the indirect and cumulative effects of pesticides on whole 
                                                          
47
 PPPR, Art 36(1). 
48
 S Jasanoff, ‘Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits’ (2006) 69 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 21, p 21. 
49
 SE Dudley and K Wegrich, ‘The Role of Transparency in Regulatory Governance: Comparing US and EU 
Regulatory Systems’ (2016) 19 Journal of Risk Research 1141, p 1143, although this presupposes that there 
exist those with the requisite expertise to perform the scrutiny. 
50
 J Stern and S Holder, ‘Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of Regulatory Systems: 
An Application to Infrastructure Industries in the Developing Countries of Asia’ (1999) 8 Utilities Policy 33, p 43. 
51
 R Deighton-Smith, ‘Regulatory Transparency in OECD Countries: Overview, Trends and Challenges’ (2004) 63 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 66, p 67. 
52
 Shapiro, note 37 above, pp 204–205. 
53
 La Porte and Metlay, note 39 above, p 344. 
54
 Commission, ‘European Governance: A White Paper COM(2001) 428 Final’, pp 15-17. 
55
 Directive (EC) 2003/35 [2003] OJ L156/17. 
56
 Arts 1, 10 and 11(2)-(3) TEU and Art 15(1) TFEU. 
57
 General Food Law, note 21 above, Arts 9, 10, 38. 
58
 B Wynne, ‘Risk and Social Learning: Reification to Engagement’ in S Krimsky and D Golding (eds), Social 
Theories of Risk (Praeger, 1992); J Pretty, ‘Preface’ in J Pretty (ed), The Pesticide Detox: Towards a More 
Sustainable Agriculture (Earthscan, 2005). 
59
 R Baldwin, ‘Regulatory Legitimacy in the European Context: The British Health and Safety Executive’ in 
Majone, note 13 above, pp 87-88. 
60
 Wynne, note 58 above. 
 8 
 
ecosystems.61 The reporting of expert deliberations, uncertainties, ambiguities and disagreements 
for example, may open up decision-making and enhance transparency.62 Given the often 
controversial nature of risk-based decision-making and the need for, and inevitability of, 
assumptions and value judgments in the assessment and management of risk,63 especially in 
situations of uncertainty, public involvement may benefit decision-making by incorporating citizens’ 
values in the weighing of uncertain benefits against uncertain risks.64 The availability of more 
information and perspectives through wider participation may generate better decisions,65 for 
example where scrutiny enables the identification of errors or contributions aid problem-solving.66 
Even where improved decisions do not result, participation is regarded as having normative value.67 
Finally, and in more practical terms, decisions about pesticides affect numerous stakeholders and 
publics across the EU, who should therefore be granted a voice. Furthermore, recent campaigns 
demanding greater transparency demonstrate an appetite for increased citizen involvement in these 
decisions.68 
In addition to elaborating various requirements of transparency, much of the literature on 
transparency is punctuated with examples of more or less transparent laws, regulation or regulators 
and sometimes more extended analyses of the achievement of transparency by a particular legal 
instrument.69 There is, however, less work which presents a sustained exploration of transparency in 
the context of a single complex, transnational regulatory regime or how transparently such a regime 
operates in practice. This article’s contribution to the literature is such an exploration of 
transparency.70 
III. EU PESTICIDES POLICY AND REGULATION: ACTIVE SUBSTANCE APPROVAL AND 
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Policy 
Pesticides have long been contested. They are valued for their contribution to maintaining crop 
yields and the production of affordable fruit and vegetables, as well as bolstering the economy more 
generally. In 2014, for example, the EU market for pesticides was worth almost €10 billion.71 They 
also, however, pose risks to human health and the environment and may themselves undermine 
                                                          
61
 J Pretty and R Hine, ‘Pesticide Use and the Environment’ in Pretty, note 58 above, pp 15-18. 
62
 Andy Stirling, ‘“Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power, Participation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal 
of Technology’ (2008) 33 Science, Technology & Human Values 262. 
63
 B Wynne, ‘Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive 
Paradigm’ (1992) 2 Global Environmental Change 111, p 116; M Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision 
Making for a New Technology (Edward Elgar, 2008), pp 41-42. 
64
 J Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem‐solving Approach’ (2001) 
21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415, pp 421-427. 
65
 J Parkins and R Mitchell, ‘Public Participation as Public Debate: A Deliberative Turn in Natural Resource 
Management’ (2005) 18 Society & Natural Resources 529, pp 531-533. 
66
 M Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making, 2
nd
 ed (Hart, 2014), p 197; Steele, note 64 
above.  
67
 F Schauer, ‘Transparency in Three Dimensions’ (2011) 2011 University of Illinois Law Review 1339, p 1349. 
68
 For example the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Glyphosate’, discussed in Part III B. 
69
 For example, C Hood, R Baldwin and H Rothstein, ‘Assessing the Dangerous Dogs Act: When Does a 
Regulatory Law Fail?’ (2000) Public Law 282; Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, note 27 above. 
70
 While the analysis identifies many deficiencies in terms of the transparency of pesticides regulation and 
therefore broad scope for reform, it is not my intention here to offer suggestions. Recommendations for 
reforming the Regulation can be found in Hamlyn, note 4 above, pp 97-101. 
71
 EPRS, EU Policy and Legislation on Pesticides: Plant protection products and biocides (EUR-OP, 2017), p 6. 
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crop protection through the elimination of natural predators and increasing pesticide resistance.72 
The turn of the century witnessed a radical change in EU pesticides policy.73 This led to repeal of the 
Regulation’s predecessor directive (‘the Directive’).74 Reviews of the Directive found its procedures 
for assessing active substances and pesticides to be inefficient, subject to delays and to encourage 
duplication of administrative work among Member States.75 Bozzini highlights three particular 
problems with the Directive which hindered fulfilment of the EU’s pesticide policy goals. Firstly, the 
challenges of establishing harmonised data requirements and approval criteria significantly delayed 
the assessment of active substances already on the market and the implementation, generally, of 
the Directive. Secondly, those delays perpetuated the existing market fragmentation, improving little 
on the pre-Directive situation in which common rules were absent. Finally, the delays in assessing 
active substances in use, alongside scarce and incomplete data, aggravated public health concerns.76  
Multiple motivations drove the reform, including reinforcing a high level of health and 
environmental protection, improved functioning of the EU internal market, harmonising availability 
of pesticides between farmers in different Member States and increasing transparency.77 While the 
Regulation retained the dual assessment system established under the Directive,78 it introduced a 
new zonal system for authorising pesticides, as mentioned in the Introduction and discussed in 
greater detail in Part IV A. Mutual recognition of pesticide authorisations within zones emerged as a 
means to achieve the aims of the reform and address the failures of mutual recognition under the 
Directive.79 Overall, the zonal system and the compulsory mutual recognition within zones it would 
facilitate, sought administrative efficiency through simplifying the authorisation procedure, 
increasing work-sharing and co-ordination between Member States within zones to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of work and reduce administrative and financial burdens for industry and 
Member States, speeding up decision-making and increasing efficiency.80 The Regulation’s recitals 
also reflect these aims.81 
In terms of policy on transparency during the reform, efforts to improve transparency in 
pesticides regulation focused mainly on the procedure for approving active substances rather than 
pesticide authorisation,82 a trend which continues today.83 The transparency of the pesticide 
authorisation process under the Directive was identified as a problem worthy of attention.84 The 
European Parliament considered ‘the greatest possible transparency in licensing and use … to be 
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essential’.85 It also criticised the system under the Directive for its lack of public access to 
information.86 It sought, therefore, to amend earlier drafts of the Regulation to ensure public access 
to information regarding applications for pesticide authorisations and to enhance the transparency 
of its procedures generally.87 The zonal system was a compromise between a fully centralised 
decision-making approach (pesticide authorisation at EU level) and the decentralised system of 
national authorisations under the Directive.88 Policy sheds little explicit light on how the system was 
conceived, its design or on any balancing of administrative efficiency against other values, such as 
transparency. Priorities are clear, however, in the iterations of the legislative text: the zonal system 
survived European Parliament objections that zones are arbitrary and conditions not comparable.89 
However, European Parliament amendments to enhance transparency survive in either a weakened 
form or not at all. 
B. Active substance approval 
Active substances are approved at EU level, with the involvement of EFSA and the Commission, 
aided by comitology. Manufacturers submit an application, consisting of a complete and summary 
dossier containing the necessary data requirements,90 for approval to a specific ‘rapporteur Member 
State’.91 Summary dossiers are made available to the public, minus any information deemed 
confidential pursuant to Article 63.92 The rapporteur Member State must conduct ‘an independent, 
objective and transparent assessment in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge’ of 
the information provided to determine ‘whether the active substance can be expected to meet the 
approval criteria’ in Article 4.93 These criteria largely relate to the safety and efficacy of the active 
substance and are discussed further in Part IV B.  
The rapporteur Member State produces a ‘draft assessment report’ which EFSA makes 
available to the public (minus confidential information), for a 60 day consultation period.94 EFSA 
adopts a conclusion on whether the active substance can be expected to meet the Article 4 criteria 
and makes it available to the Commission, Member States and the public.95 Taking into account the 
draft assessment report and EFSA’s conclusion, the Commission produces a ‘review report’ and draft 
regulation, providing for approval, or not, of the active substance, which it submits to the Standing 
Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (comitology).96 Once approved, manufacturers can 
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apply for authorisation to market the pesticide containing that approved active substance.97 The 
Commission is required to maintain a publicly available list of approved active substances.98 
A recent study supporting the regulatory fitness (REFIT) evaluation of the Regulation 
examined the transparency of the active substance procedure. While it found that EFSA publishes a 
range of information, including summary dossiers, rapporteur draft assessment reports, reasoned 
opinions and conclusions on pesticides and member-lists and minutes of pesticides peer review 
expert meetings, the quality of this information has been criticised as being either too complex or 
too basic and uninformative.99 With respect to public participation, although there is a 60 day 
consultation period, stakeholders faced challenges to contributing due to a lack of resources and the 
tight timeframes, NGOs regarded the opportunities for civil society involvement to be insufficient 
and over a third of stakeholders felt that their contributions were not valued.100  
Despite these criticisms, compared to pesticide authorisation (discussed below), this 
procedure is fairly transparent, in terms of public access to key documents and information and at 
least the existence of an opportunity for consultation. However, two recent events in particular led 
to proposals to change the EU level procedure: the 2017 European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘Stop 
Glyphosate’,101 and a REFIT evaluation of the General Food Law.102 Their combined criticisms, 
foreshadowing the criticisms highlighted by the REFIT evaluation of the Regulation and largely 
supported by the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee,103 identified a lack of trust in EU 
regulatory decision-making stemming from the non-disclosure of data, the industry source of that 
data, reliance on unpublished studies and confidentiality requirements, in place to protect 
commercial interests.104 The REFIT evaluation of the General Food Law found that civil society 
regarded many authorisation procedures in EU food legislation as lacking transparency and advised 
EFSA to ‘adapt its way of working to the new expected levels of transparency’ in order to protect its 
reputation.105 The ECI demanded greater transparency specifically in the active substance approval 
procedure.106 
In response, the Commission committed to enhancing the transparency of the active 
substance approval procedure by adjusting the balance between disclosure of information and 
ensuring commercial confidentiality, where legitimate, through for example, increasing public access 
to studies contained in applications.107 Its subsequent legislative proposal aims to enhance the 
transparency of EFSA’s risk assessment procedures in the area of food law in order to increase its 
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legitimacy and public confidence in its work.108 Proposed measures include making public scientific 
data and information contained in authorisation applications under EU food law as early as possible 
and providing for consultation of stakeholders to identify whether other relevant scientific data or 
studies are available, alongside stricter requirements with respect to the disclosure of information 
about EFSA’s activities and a higher threshold for confidential treatment of information contained in 
applications.109 Amendments proposed specifically to the Regulation ensure that the above 
proposed changes apply to active substance approval. Most notably, a new Article 10 requires EFSA 
to make public both dossiers submitted by applicants for approval, not just summary dossiers.110 
Little changes with respect to pesticide authorisation, although the higher threshold for confidential 
treatment appears to apply.111 However, how some of the proposed provisions will interact with 
current provisions on confidentiality is unclear.112 On the whole, provisions explicitly enhancing 
transparency remain confined to active substance approval. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND PESTICIDES REGULATION 
A. Pesticide evaluation and authorisation 
As mentioned, the Regulation divides EU Member States (and Norway) into Northern, Central and 
Southern zones.113 The aim is to improve efficiency,114 avoid duplication of work, reduce 
administrative burdens on industry and Member States, increase harmonisation and facilitate 
mutual recognition of authorisations.115 The authorisation procedure and communication and co-
ordination between Member States are facilitated by three ‘zonal steering committees’, one for 
each zone, and an ‘inter-zonal steering committee’. Neither zonal steering committees nor the inter-
zonal steering committee is provided for in the Regulation. The zonal steering committees are 
chaired by participating Member States and meet every two months ‘to discuss specific applications 
and issues arising which should be fed into’ the inter-zonal steering committee.116 
An applicant seeking authorisation must submit a ‘draft Registration Report’, which contains 
information and data on the risk assessment and risk management of the pesticide,117 to each 
Member State in which it intends to place the pesticide on the market.118 Evaluation of the 
application is conducted at ‘zonal’ level by the ‘zonal rapporteur Member State’ whose conclusions 
provide the basis for final, national authorisation decisions. To avoid duplication of work, other 
Member States in the same zone may not proceed with the file pending zonal rapporteur Member 
State evaluation.119 To facilitate efficient and swift operation of the zonal procedure, applicants 
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should request pre-submission meetings with their proposed zonal rapporteur Member State to 
enable discussion of the application, its potential problems, quality and strategy.120 
The zonal rapporteur Member State must make an independent, objective and transparent 
assessment of the application ‘in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge’ using 
available guidance documents and allowing other Member States in the same zone to submit 
comments for consideration in the assessment.121 In order to determine whether the pesticide 
meets the requirements established in Article 29 of the Regulation,122 it must apply the Uniform 
Principles.123 The zonal rapporteur Member State must make its assessment available to the other 
Member States in the same zone (the ‘concerned Member States’) and allow an opportunity for 
comments.124 The zonal rapporteur Member State may communicate with an applicant, for example 
to request additional information,125 and should seek its comments on the zonal draft Registration 
Report.126 The zonal rapporteur Member State produces a final assessment, in the form of a 
Registration Report, and decides whether to grant or refuse authorisation.127 The concerned 
Member States must grant or refuse authorisations on the basis of the conclusions of the zonal 
rapporteur Member State.128 Concerned Member States may still assess their own national 
requirements and impose appropriate conditions and ‘other risk mitigation measures’ in their own 
national authorisations.129 In limited cases, a concerned Member State may refuse authorisation.130  
1. The rules of the game 
The zonal evaluation and authorisation procedure operates differently in different Member States 
and zones, within the above framework. There are many examples but two suffice to illustrate here. 
Firstly, different Member States treat incomplete applications differently, with some rejecting such 
applications outright and requiring resubmission and others accepting submission of missing data. 
Secondly, some Member States treat the expert advice supplied to decision-makers on the risk 
assessments in applications as binding while others treat it as purely consultative.131 As discussed in 
Part II, transparency in the context of this regime requires clarity with respect to the rules governing 
the pesticide authorisation procedure in each Member State. Such clarity meets both the practical 
needs of applicants and the desires of any interested parties to understand the authorisation 
procedure, actors involved and how information in the application is used and assessed. In terms of 
the law, the Regulation imposes no obligation on Member States to publish information about their 
national authorisation procedures and requirements. In terms of national implementation, the level 
of information available in different Member States is highly variable. For example, the websites of 
some Member State CAs (such as the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium) contain 
comprehensive information on application and data requirements while at least one Member State 
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CA website publishes no information.132 Given the procedural differences between Member States, 
the rules by which their procedures operate cannot be assumed or guessed. The lack, or uneven 
availability, of information about the rules of the game impedes understanding of evaluation and 
authorisation procedures amongst interested parties, undermining transparency per se and perhaps 
too fulfilment of the requirements for transparency discussed in Parts IV A 2 and 3 below. 
2. Access to information 
Despite its potential drawbacks, as discussed in Part II, transparency requires access to information. 
Measures providing for access to information, for example, publishing decisions, the reasons for 
those decisions and their informational basis, and providing opportunities for interested parties to 
evaluate the knowledge used to justify those decisions may enhance accountability, increase trust in 
regulators and facilitate democratic control of discretionary decision-making. 
The Regulation imposes no requirement on Member States to give reasons for their 
authorisation decisions, demonstrating a lack of ambition in the legislation in terms of ensuring 
transparency through access to information. Uniform Principle A.5 second paragraph requires 
Member States to ‘come to a reasoned decision within 12 months of receiving a technically 
complete dossier’ but omits a requirement for its publication.133 The Regulation’s requirements on 
access to information provide some measure of transparency with respect to individual pesticides 
and the knowledge base for decisions. Article 57 obliges Member States to keep certain information 
electronically available to the public on pesticides authorised or withdrawn under the Regulation. 
Article 60(2) requires Member States to compile and make available on request, lists of test and 
study reports concerning individual pesticides and the substances they contain, including those for 
which the applicant claimed data protection under Article 59. The lists include information on 
whether the reports were ‘certified as compliant with the principles of good laboratory practice or of 
good experimental practice’,134 enabling some scrutiny of the quality of the information used in 
decision-making.  
Beyond the legal requirements in the Regulation, Commission guidance recommends 
publication of the final Registration Report ‘if legal provisions in the individual MS allow’, minus 
confidential information.135 Registration Reports contain reasons for decisions and a Reporting Table 
recording unresolved differences of opinion on technical issues between the zonal rapporteur 
Member State and concerned Member State ‘for transparency reasons’.136 Levels of publication of 
decisions among Member States vary. Some CAs publish all authorisation decisions while some 
publish most or only some. The French CA, for example, publishes the conclusions of its evaluation 
and part of the Registration Report for the purposes of transparency.137 Some do not publish 
decisions to reject applications, perhaps due to classifying this information as commercially 
confidential. Very few Member States publish the information on which decisions are based or the 
Registration Reports, though they may be accessible through national legislation on access to 
information.138 While mere guidance is unable to compel disclosure, Member States are discussing 
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publication of Registration Reports, indicating an appetite to enhance transparency through national 
implementation of norms found in guidance, despite the lack of legal requirements.139  
Furthermore, the content of Registration Reports suggests that at least some parts would be 
disclosable under Article 4(2) Directive (EC) 2003/4,140 which provides that CAs may not refuse 
disclosure of ‘information on emissions into the environment’, unless one of the limited exceptions 
in paragraphs (b), (c) or (e) applies.141 The CJEU, in Bayer,142 endorsed a broad interpretation of 
‘emissions … into the environment, affecting or likely to affect’ the environment,143 finding that it 
covered emissions of pesticides and the substances contained in them.144 Although the CJEU limits 
information disclosable to that relating to actual or foreseeable emissions under ‘normal and 
realistic conditions of use’,145 and despite remaining ambiguity,146 this interpretation may mean large 
amounts of data and studies are disclosable, under the guidelines laid down by the CJEU for CAs, 
including importantly, information on the medium- to long-term consequences of emissions on the 
environment.147 More recently, the CJEU extended this interpretation to similar provisions requiring 
EU institutions to disclose information which ‘relates to emissions into the environment’.148 In these 
judgments, the CJEU explicitly recognises that the public require access to information relating to 
emissions into the environment to check whether the assessments on which CAs base their 
authorisation decisions are correct and to understand the effects of emissions on the environment, 
in order thereby, to review the justifications for those decisions.149 Finally, these cases suggest the 
incremental spread of transparency illuminating the pesticides regulatory landscape; something 
which may continue in the future. 
The increased availability of such information certainly has the potential to enhance 
transparency. However, simply disclosing information is often insufficient; the information itself 
must be ‘intelligible, clear and ultimately accountable’.150 If Registration Reports are of poor quality 
or available solely in the national language, publication may provide only limited improvements in 
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transparency.151 Furthermore, the communication of information must be audience-sensitive to be 
effective.152 Even this is not straightforward; public communication activities that purport to 
disseminate factual information in the interests of transparency may instead seek to effect social 
control through manipulating public opinion and influencing behaviour.153 Finally, the capacity of the 
recipient of the information to appraise and use that information matters. Transparency differs little 
from concealment in a society lacking ‘an active interpretive culture willing to criticise and able to 
make sense’ of the disclosed information.154 In the highly specialised world of pesticides, review by 
any scientific expert may not be enough; the right expert is required, and even they must be 
sufficiently detached from the subject matter to ensure unbiased review.155  
Overall, the Regulation imposes no requirement on Member States to publish their 
assessments, decisions on authorisation and the reasons and information behind decisions. As Bayer 
and experience of EU level litigation over access to documents suggest,156 even with rights 
established in legislation, access in practice may remain challenging. Finally, publishing decisions is a 
relatively unambitious form of accountability,157 suggesting the importance of the openness of the 
entire decision-making process.158 
3. Public participation 
Part II highlighted the link between wider participation in decision-making and enhanced 
transparency, and a consequential increase in accountability, trust in regulators and public support 
for decisions. Furthermore, in circumstances characterised by high levels of complexity and social 
and ecological uncertainty, engaging with a broad range of participants contributing different 
knowledge and values, may generate better decisions, aid identification of errors and help solve 
problems. 
In terms of legal requirements, the Regulation contains no provision for public or 
stakeholder engagement during either the zonal evaluation or national authorisation procedures. 
With respect to the operation of national procedures, again, Member State practice varies, with 
some CAs consulting, for example, farmers and other pesticide users or other actors involved in 
plant protection.159 Evidence suggests that few, if any, CAs consult wider industry, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) or publics. Indeed, Member States would not welcome wider participation due 
to, amongst other things, fear of NGO pressure and the influence of non-scientific opinions or public 
opinion in the decision-making process. Furthermore, despite provision, in the Regulation and 
guidance, of opportunities for contact between zonal rapporteur Member States and applicants 
during evaluation (discussed above), few zonal rapporteur Member States appear to maintain good 
channels of communication with applicants in practice.160 That said, evidence also suggests that 
industry may have regular contact with CAs at national and zonal levels on matters other than 
specific applications, including procedural and scientific issues, for example interpretation and 
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implementation of the Regulation and interpretation of application and dossier requirements, and 
participation in annual open zonal steering committee meetings in the Central and Southern zones in 
which similar matters are discussed.161  
B. Why improve transparency at pesticide authorisation? 
Criteria for approving active substances and authorising pesticides are complex so some detail is 
necessarily excluded. Article 4(1) provides that an active substance ‘shall be approved … if it may be 
expected that [pesticides] containing that active substance meet the requirements provided for in 
paragraphs 2 and 3’ of Article 4. Article 4(2) requires that the residues of the pesticide in question do 
not have ‘any harmful effects on human health’ or ‘any unacceptable effect on the environment’. 
Article 4(3) requires, inter alia, that the pesticide be ‘sufficiently effective’ and that it has ‘no 
immediate or delayed harmful effect on human health’ and no unacceptable effects on plants, plant 
products or the environment. Article 4(5) provides that compliance with these requirements may be 
demonstrated by ‘one or more representative uses of at least one’ pesticide containing the relevant 
active substance. Active substances are assessed ‘as if’ they are in pesticides and ‘having regard to 
realistic conditions of use’.162 However, the minimum requirement for one representative use of one 
pesticide confines assessment, perhaps necessarily, to a certain level of generality despite the likely 
diverse conditions of eventual use. By contrast, the requirements for authorisation of pesticides 
envisage an extended range of considerations, including exposure risks posed by its technical 
formulation, that the nature and quality of its ingredients (active substances, safeners, synergists 
and co-formulants), relevant impurities and residues can be determined and that its physical and 
chemical properties are acceptable for appropriate use and storage.163 Context of use shines more 
strongly through these requirements. For example, under Article 29(3), compliance with many 
requirements must be assessed ‘under agricultural, plant health and environmental conditions’ 
relevant to the use of the pesticide in question and ‘representative of the conditions prevailing in 
the [relevant] zone’. Finally, the interaction between the ingredients in the pesticide must be 
considered.164 
The considerations relevant to active substance approval and pesticide authorisation differ 
in nature, number and context-specificity and many emerge only at the authorisation stage. That 
active substance evaluation does not, and probably cannot (without lengthy delays), take into 
account use-, context- and final product-specific criteria militates towards increasing the 
transparency of the stage of decision-making at which they are considered; authorisation. EFSA has 
conceded that the distinction between active substances and pesticides may explain the difference 
between its conclusions on the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate, having assessed glyphosate 
alone, and those of the International Agency for Research on Cancer which also assessed glyphosate-
based formulations.165 Assessment against the conditions prevailing in the relevant zone, in 
particular, presents a reason for wider local/national engagement in decision-making through access 
to relevant information and participation. Such questions may become more pertinent when closer 
to the publics most likely to be affected by the decision and zonal evaluation and national 
authorisation represent the last opportunity for those publics and stakeholders to contribute 
national and culture-specific concerns, values and knowledge to decision-making. There is, 
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furthermore, recognition in high-level EU policy circles, and elsewhere, that the transparency of 
pesticide authorisation requires improvement.166 
V. SHADES OF TRANSPARENCY AND CHIAROSCURO REGULATION 
The above discussion suggests that the Regulation, overall, does not operate transparently. 
However, to enlighten our understanding of transparency in complex risk regulation regimes, this 
claim may be further nuanced. The meaning, benefits and limitations of transparency, and its 
implications, vary depending on context.167 There are, furthermore, different degrees of 
transparency which influence its capacity to facilitate knowledge,168 for example, the amount 
revealed, and the size and identity of the permitted audience. Transparency may move in different 
directions, illuminate either events or processes and occur in retrospect or real-time.169 It may also 
manifest different forms at different times, levels of governance and depending on the purpose it 
serves.170 The following discussion reinforces this understanding of transparency and elucidates 
additional areas of variation. Firstly, comparison between active substance approval and pesticide 
authorisation reveals that, even within a single regulatory regime or piece of legislation, levels of 
transparency can vary significantly depending on procedure and regulatory object (here, active 
substance or pesticide), notwithstanding the interdependence of both procedures and regulatory 
objects. Secondly, I highlight the almost infinitely variable levels of transparency accorded to 
different interested parties during pesticide authorisation.  
I use the concept of ‘chiaroscuro regulation’ here to capture and describe certain 
characteristics of the regime and the nature of these variations in transparency. As discussed in Parts 
III B and IV A, these variations and characteristics stem from the legal requirements governing active 
substance approval and pesticide authorisation, their implementation – particularly national 
implementation of the pesticide authorisation procedure – and policy developments.171 Firstly, the 
concept seeks to highlight the dramatic contrasts in levels of transparency between different 
procedures, levels of governance, regulatory objects and, within pesticide authorisation, different 
CAs. Secondly, it illustrates the idea, with respect to audience, that the same regulatory object, 
procedure or CA may appear visible or illuminated from some angles or perspectives but invisible or 
obfuscated from other angles. Finally, it acknowledges the incremental and particular nature of 
developments in transparency. The Commission’s proposal to improve the transparency of risk 
assessment in the food chain (see Part III B) and CJEU case law on transparency in pesticides 
regulation (see Part IV A 3), while marking positive steps, will not flood the entire regime with light. 
Though they may shift or recede, shadows remain where improvements in transparency focus only 
on specific areas or are approached from specific directions. These characteristics are elaborated 
further below. The analysis closes with a brief discussion of some of the potential consequences of 
chiaroscuro regulation. 
A. Active substance approval vs pesticide authorisation 
The Commission acknowledges that currently transparency and confidentiality rules vary depending 
on the sub-area of food law.172 However, the variations extend beyond the sub-areas into different 
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procedures within the Regulation. As discussed in Part III B, though not ambitious, active substance 
approval enjoys some degree of transparency and garners the vast majority of current proposed 
transparency-related improvements. The determinants of issue salience are complex. However, the 
glyphosate and neonicotinoid (all active substances) controversies may constitute ‘focusing events’ 
which, combined with media attention, increase visibility and channel items onto the political 
agenda.173 Occurrence at EU level and the high profile of EFSA and the Commission make active 
substance approval visible and perhaps therefore an obvious target for attention, despite its 
distance from EU citizens.  
By contrast, pesticide authorisation offers little transparency although, as discussed in Part 
IV A, there is some variation between Member States. Potential reasons may include the lower 
profile of pesticides and lower visibility of national decision-making partly stemming from the 
absence of detail on the operation and institutions of the zonal system on the face of the 
legislation.174 For example, the Regulation does not mention zonal steering committees. They are 
mentioned only in guidance,175 which establishes a very loose framework for their operation and 
omits detailed norms pertaining to transparency, although part of their remit is to ensure 
transparency.176  
Regulatory regimes are not delimited by legal instruments but rather extend to ‘the norms, 
the mechanisms of decision making, and the network of actors … involved in regulation’.177 Risk 
regulation regimes, such as that examined here, consist in ‘the complex of institutional geography, 
rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk or 
hazard’, extending to ‘highly fragmented administration and complex overlapping systems 
controlling related aspects of a risk’.178 Thus, in a decentred regime, the role of state law may 
diminish, ceding space to other forms and sources of norm-generation, for example guidance.179 
Vaughan has argued that a function of post-legislative guidance, such as that mentioning zonal 
steering committees, is to ‘extrapolate’ from the legal text where that text is silent. The aim is to fill 
a gap left by that silence where necessary to ensure operation of the legislation in question,180 ie, 
the Regulation. Here, zonal steering committees themselves and the rules on their functioning are 
necessary for the zonal system to work.  
Procedures for adopting soft post-legislative acts (such as guidance) may themselves lack 
transparency due to, inter alia, the absence of information about participating stakeholders, wider 
consultations and oversight by the Council, Parliament or comitology.181 Indeed, the Commission’s 
guidance document on zonal evaluation, which mentions zonal steering committees,182 discloses 
scant information as to its genesis. On the other hand, this is arguably a small price to pay if the 
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guidance or rules enhance legal certainty or the effective operation of the regime.183 However, there 
is evidence of industry influence, at a zonal level, on the development of zonal practice,184 which 
may pose problems, as discussed further in Part V C. Furthermore, in addition to the manner of 
adoption, the arrangements instituted by guidance, once established, may remain adumbrated. 
Discovering the existence of, and information about, zonal steering committees requires effort and 
some initial knowledge of what one is searching for, itself hard to obtain. Once discovered, zonal 
steering committees are inaccessible. For example, the Central zonal steering committee publishes 
some information on matters such as meetings or evaluation procedures on CIRCABC – an EU online 
communication and information resource centre with some publicly available pages. However, users 
require a (free) account and locating relevant documents is not straightforward. Overall, pesticide 
authorisation remains in the shadows.  
It is noticeable that active substance approval, which, compared to pesticide authorisation, 
is the more transparent procedure under the Regulation, attracts proposals for transparency-
enhancing reforms. Risk regulation regimes have faced increasing, though not universal, pressures 
for more openness. Such pressures do not necessarily coincide with low initial levels of openness 
and vary in terms of responses to pressures and elements of the regime targeted for increased 
openness.185 Here, it may be that the limited transparency of active substance approval acts as a 
baseline from which to demand more, whereas the obscurity of pesticide authorisation, particularly 
the zonal system, raises the question whether there is enough knowledge of it in the first place to 
provoke agitation for more.  
B. Differential transparency in pesticide authorisation 
Despite an overall lack of transparency in the pesticide authorisation procedure, there are occasional 
flashes of transparency from some CAs, benefiting certain audiences. Regarding applicants, the 
availability of pre-submission meetings and the communication between CAs and applicants, for 
example during evaluation, help clarify the rules of the game and enable greater access to the 
regulator’s decision-making process. This suggests increased transparency, although the prevalence 
of these practices varies according to CA, as discussed in Part IV A 3.186 Greater transparency to 
wider industry may also be indicated by the ‘regular contact’ with CAs at national and zonal level 
outside specific applications.187 This suggests potential for some involvement by industry in the 
operation of the regime generally, including input into shaping its implementation and questions of 
interpretation. However, industry is not monolithic and these limited instances of transparency do 
not extend to every industry actor. The inaccessibility of original Registration Reports, for example, 
disadvantages the generic pesticide industry for whom they represent valuable guidance for putting 
together applications.188  
Citizens and CSOs, by contrast, tend to experience much lower levels of transparency. Given 
the lack (with a few exceptions) of clear information from CAs about national authorisation 
procedures, the challenges of accessing information and an absence of opportunities for wider 
public participation in decision-making, as discussed in Part IV A, the pesticide authorisation 
procedure is not transparent with respect to publics and wider civil society. PAN-Europe notes that a 
drawback of zonal authorisation is the variable practices of stakeholder representation and 
transparency amongst Member States, as opposed to the Commission’s flawed, but ‘fair’ policy of 
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stakeholder representation and transparency. It also expresses concern regarding close relationships 
between Member States and industry while other stakeholders are kept at a distance.189 CSOs have 
expressed a similar sentiment with respect to active substance approval where they believe 
industrial interests are favoured over the public interest.190 As discussed above, a feature of the 
zonal system is its obscurity and distance from citizens/CSOs, of whom few may be aware of its 
existence or procedures and of whom many may not have the resources to discover more, let alone 
participate. 
In sum, in the context of a highly complex, polycentric and decentred multi-actor regulatory 
regime, it is impossible to draw final conclusions identifying a single level of transparency which 
holds true for the entire regime, including its implementation by Member States, both now and in 
the future. There are contrasts in transparency, depending on the relevant procedure, and the 
shades of transparency, even within one procedure, are almost innumerable. Overall, transparency 
varies according to individual regulator practice, actor or audience, level of governance, regulatory 
procedure and regulatory object. Its evolution, furthermore, appears influenced by existing levels of 
transparency and the high profile (or otherwise) of the regulatory object, reflecting further the 
incremental, particular and contingent nature of developments in transparency. Even if, therefore, a 
decision is made at EU level which, as a supranational decision-making procedure, may arguably 
seem further removed from citizens than zonal or national levels, if it is controversial or already 
visible, drives to improve transparency may be stronger.  
C. Consequences of chiaroscuro regulation 
Transparency is not necessarily an unalloyed good. It may have unintended consequences and 
requires more than simply ‘turning on the light’.191 Increasing transparency may jeopardise other 
important goals or values.192 There are, for example, arguments for secrecy or concealment and 
transparency may have to compete with other important social values which differ, depending on 
context.193 Commercial confidentiality,194 national security and the protection of personal data are 
all in tension with transparency.195 So too, are other valued objects such as effectiveness, fairness 
and legitimacy as well as trust and accountability themselves.196 Furthermore, non-disclosure may be 
valuable for promoting honesty and frankness.197  
However, despite its complexity, transparency, alongside ‘openness’, is now widely accepted 
as a principle of good governance. Some argue it is a general administrative law principle.198 Others 
contend it is a general principle of EU law.199 Similarly, ‘openness’, interpreted as communication 
about EU activity and decisions in ‘accessible and understandable’ language, is recognised by the 
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Commission as a principle of good governance.200 Although ‘there is no necessary or automatic link 
between transparency and other values’,201 it has the potential to offer multiple benefits. As 
discussed above, it is regarded as key to ensuring greater public accountability. Furthermore, though 
arguable, it may increase public trust or confidence in a regulator and decision-making process. It is 
linked, in the eyes of many, including the EU, to trust and legitimacy.202 For example, as a principle 
which facilitates citizen participation in decision-making, transparency is intended to ‘guarantee that 
the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the 
citizen’.203 More specifically, there are good reasons for enhancing the transparency of pesticide 
evaluation and authorisation separate to the measures taken with respect to active substance 
approval.204 
In its current form, the Regulation, particularly pesticide authorisation, is unable to reap 
such benefits. Furthermore, the potential for context-specific knowledge to enhance the quality of 
national decisions is lost in the absence of participatory opportunities. Transparency, per se, does 
not guarantee the quality of decisions. However, its absence deprives interested parties of the ability 
to judge.  
More specifically, the uneven levels of transparency between the procedures for active 
substance approval and pesticide authorisation raises concerns. The Commission’s response to the 
ECI, while arguing that it had no basis for banning glyphosate, notes that Member States must still 
evaluate all authorisations for pesticides containing glyphosate and may themselves impose a ban or 
restrictions where warranted on evidence related to the particular circumstances in their 
territories.205 While technically true, this overlooks the real danger that post-active substance 
approval, subsequent pesticide evaluation and authorisation will disappear into the shadowy zonal 
system, unilluminated by any formal transparency mechanisms to support public scrutiny, 
contributions to or influence of decision-making. Citizens are entitled to know which pesticides are 
authorised in their territory and the reasons and data behind the specific, national decision. The 
European Parliament has described the existing system of access to information as ‘totally 
obstructive’,206 arguing that ‘the public should be entitled to access the information on the chemicals 
they are exposed to’.207 The EU’s Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM) notes that there is ‘no 
complete single overview of which pesticides are authorised, including where they are authorised in 
the EU and for which uses, as well as their market penetration and actual use’.208 Ultimately, it is no 
less important, given the requirements for pesticide authorisation discussed in Part IV B, that 
national citizens are able to hold national regulators to account via transparency mechanisms and 
contribute to decision-making, than EU citizens are with respect to EU-level actors regulators and 
procedures.  
Differential transparency between industry generally and civil society may also have 
consequences. Private, economic actors (applicants) provide the majority of the information on 
which authorisation decisions are based.209 Given the resources available to applicants and 
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regulators respectively,210 this is reasonable and may increase the cost effectiveness and efficiency 
of regulation.211 It is also arguably inappropriate to use public funds to facilitate pesticide 
commercialisation and thereby gains which ultimately accrue to private industry.212 Reliance on such 
sources does, however, raise concerns regarding information asymmetry and the potential for 
industry to frame or manipulate regulator perceptions through the supply of selective or biased 
information.213 Likewise, contact between industry and CAs arguably improves the efficient 
operation of the zonal system, for example through early resolution of problems with applications 
(as policy intended – see Part IV A). However, industry itself is largely free from public oversight and 
norms militating towards openness or acting in the public interest, raising concerns regarding 
accountability (although alternative accountability mechanisms may operate).214 Such collaboration 
may decrease the relational distance between regulator and industry, potentially increasing the risk 
of capture.  
Transparency may respond to involvement by private, particularly economic, actors in 
regulation.215 It can, for example, ensure the public knows who is involved in, and what they are 
contributing to, the regulatory process, granting opportunities for scrutiny and reducing information 
asymmetries,216 again supporting accountability. Access to information, for example the content of 
pre-submission meetings,217 may reduce the risk of capture and industry influence may decrease 
with increased participation by other interests.218 Thus, transparency may facilitate democracy, 
enabling public control to counter corruption or regulatory capture.219 The absence of such 
transparency mechanisms, and contingent accountability gains, compromises the ability of publics to 
counteract industry influence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Regulation generally, and its provisions governing the authorisation of pesticides in the EU 
specifically, offer rich insights into transparency in the context of a highly complex, polycentric and 
decentred, multi-actor, transnational risk regulation regime. These insights are encapsulated in the 
notion of ‘chiaroscuro regulation,’ which describes the myriad, and sharply contrasting, variations in 
transparency, shaded according to actor or audience, level of governance, regulatory object, 
Member State practice, regulatory procedure and perhaps still other factors yet to be demystified. 
There is no drawing of universal conclusions about levels of transparency, even within a single 
regime or piece of legislation. Furthermore, drives to enhance transparency, for example 
Commission policy on food safety regulation including active substance approval, evidence from the 
                                                          
210
 Lee, note 63 above, p 78. 
211
 Abbot and Lee, note 195 above, p 10. 
212
 Commission, note 107 above, p 11. 
213
 BM Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms  
(Columbia University Press, 1980), pp 209-211; MP Ferretti, ‘Why Public Participation in Risk Regulation? The 
Case of Authorizing GMO Products in the European Union’ (2007) 16 Science as Culture 377, p 385. 
214
 J Freeman, ‘Private Parties, Public Function and the Real Democracy Problem in the New Administrative 
State’ in D Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Hart, 1999); B Morgan and K 
Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p 281. 
215
 Abbot and Lee, note 195 above, pp 21-24; Fisher, note 17 above, pp 312-313. 
216
 Abbot and Lee, note 195 above, p 21; R Gönenç, M Maher and G Nicoletti, ‘The Implementation and the 
Effects of Regulatory Reform’ (2000) OECD Economics Department Working Papers 251, p 44. 
217
 As suggested by SAM, note 123 above, p 39. 
218
 S Webb Yackee, ‘Reconsidering Agency Capture during Regulatory Policymaking’ in DP Carpenter and DA 
Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and how to Limit it (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) and references therein. 
219
 Schauer, note 67 above, pp 1348–1349. 
 24 
 
recent REFIT evaluation of the Regulation, the CJEU’s decision in Bayer and other recent case law,220 
and Member States’ own discussions on access to information, reveal the potential for future 
change.221 As such, conclusions drawn now about levels of transparency in the Regulation are not 
fixed, indicating the diversity of drivers of transparency and the evolution of transparency through 
time. Recent developments also suggest that change is contingent, as well as gradual and partial, 
leaving elements of the Regulation in the dark. Given the drawbacks of transparency, discussed 
above, some remaining darkness may arguably be desirable. However, the inumbration of certain 
elements of the regime, characteristic of chiaroscuro regulation, undermines enjoyment of the 
potential benefits of transparency. Uneven or diminished clarity regarding procedural rules and 
access to information at different levels of governance or with respect to different procedures or 
regulators reduces opportunities for public involvement and scrutiny. Differential transparency, 
depending on actor (put crudely, industry or civil society), weakens opportunities to counter-balance 
influence from a particular quarter, in this case, industry. These combine to reduce the potential for 
democratic accountability, better decisions or for a polity to make that judgment. 
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